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Abstract
Prosecution in the court is one of the Australian Taxation Office’s (Tax Office's) last resort
enforcement procedures for the small numbers of taxpayers who fail to lodge a tax return.
The Tax Office has generally assumed that prosecution will obtain lodgment of the return
being sought and, via deterrence, improve longer-term compliance behaviour in the
prosecuted individual. This paper examines these assumptions by relating tax return data to
the outcomes of court cases of prosecuted individuals. The results show that prosecutions
were only moderately successful in obtaining lodgment and that lodgment rates (for
prosecuted taxpayers) reduced significantly in subsequent years. Nevertheless, these
lodgment rates were still three to four times greater than those of taxpayers who were
selected for prosecution but did not receive the summons issued to them. There were also
reasonable levels of lodgment when a summons was withdrawn at the request of the
taxpayer, suggesting that a full prosecution is not required in every case. The results also
show that a large fine is linked to lower levels of lodgment.
Prosecuting non-lodgers: To persuade or punish?
Robert Williams1
Introduction
The main tax collected by the Australian Taxation Office (Tax Office) is income tax, and the
main payers of income tax are individuals.  In order to establish the amount of income
earned, and to assess the amount of tax owed, the Commissioner of Taxation requires all
eligible people to lodge a statement of earnings in the form of an annual income tax return.
This requirement is enshrined in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, and failure to comply
is a breach of the Act.  While the vast majority of people ‘voluntarily’ comply with the
requirement to lodge a return, a small minority do not.  For those who fail to respond to all
normal letters and reminders, prosecution in the courts is one of the Commissioner’s last
options for obtaining compliance.  While such individuals represent less than 0.1% of the
total taxpaying population, they are nevertheless significant, as any suggestion that a small
group of people do not lodge is detrimental to the integrity of the tax system as a whole.
This paper investigates the effectiveness of prosecution as an approach for obtaining
lodgment of a tax return, its effect on the future compliance behaviour of people who have
been prosecuted and, by implication, its effect on maintaining the integrity of the tax system.
The results obtained suggest that prosecution is only moderately successful in obtaining
lodgment and that the compliance effect reduces with time.  They also suggest that severity
of punishment is not correlated with compliance levels and that it may be the fact of being
punished that is the important factor in determining compliance response.
Background
The Tax Office is moving away from a purely deterrent regulatory framework towards a
graduated suite of responses that are tailored to compliance behaviour.  The notion of
                                                          
1 This paper was written while the author was on secondment to the Centre for Tax System Integrity from the
Tax Office.
graduated responses is encapsulated in the Tax Office Compliance Model (see Figure 1).
This is a modified form of the regulatory pyramid described by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992)
that has been adapted for a taxation context.
Figure 1: The Tax Office Compliance Model.
Citizens classified as self regulators are those who voluntarily comply in response to
education or persuasion.  Those in the command regulation categories are usually less ready
to comply and, accordingly, receive a firmer regulatory intervention.  Interventions are
intended to move taxpayers ‘down the pyramid’ to self-regulation.  The benefit to the
Commissioner of achieving this outcome is not only improved compliance but also reduced
costs, as the stronger the sanction required the more labour-intensive and costly the
treatments become.  To illustrate, education will cost roughly the same whether there are
seven million or eight million taxpayers, while audit or prosecution in court necessarily
involves work on a case-by-case basis.  The narrowing at the peak of the pyramid implies
that fewer and fewer people occupy the higher categories.  This is consistent with the pattern
of behaviour found in Tax Office clients, where approximately 98% of taxpayers are in the
self-regulation categories, at least in relation to lodging their tax returns.2
                                                          
2 Research commissioned by the Tax Office showed that, for 1997, 1.9% of taxpayers were rated as medium
lodgment risk which means some sort of compliance intervention was necessary. A further 0.04% were rated as
high risk, meaning that a more severe intervention, such as a prosecution, was needed.  The remainder complied
without intervention (Commissioner of Taxation, 2000).
While responsive regulation recognises that a suite of responses are required to move people
‘down the pyramid’ it largely leaves it up to the regulators to determine the practical
interventions for achieving this outcome.  In his recent book, The Regulatory Craft (2000),
Malcolm Sparrow provides a framework for solving regulatory problems such as the non-
lodgment problem faced by the Tax Office.  His view is that regulators should stop thinking
about regulatory responses in terms of their existing ‘toolbox’ rather than in terms of the
problems to be solved.  The danger of a tool-based approach is that the tool, rather than being
the means to an end, becomes an end in itself.  An analogy could be the use of fines to deter
people from speeding – fines are a tool designed to limit high-speed accidents, but eventually
the writing of speeding tickets becomes the aim of police.
Sparrow also argues that concentration on tools can lead to an emphasis on low
complexity/high turnover cases at the expense of complex/high cost cases.  This is
undesirable as it erodes the ability to respond to difficult cases and this ‘erodes confidence in
the law from other more compliant individuals’.  Sparrow suggests that instead of using
routine responses to regulatory issues, regulators should clearly identify the problem, analyse
the relevant data, and then design the appropriate response to the problem.3  This response
can be entirely novel and may or may not include existing tools and programs.  In Sparrow’s
terms, this paper will examine the ‘problem’ of non-lodgment or, more precisely, the failure
of taxpayers to provide information about their income, and the ‘tool’ of prosecution.
Prosecution in the courts is one of the strongest sanctions available to the Tax Office and it is
used on only the most reluctant taxpayers.  While prosecution is used for the more serious
offences, such as fraud and serious evasion, it is used on a large scale to deal with non-
lodgment of tax returns.4  It is generally assumed by the Tax Office that prosecution will
produce immediate compliance in the prosecuted individual, as well as deter future non-
compliant behaviour.  The capacity to prosecute is also believed to produce a wider deterrent
effect that keeps other taxpayers at the cooperative end of the compliance model.  These
assumptions appear to have been untested to date.  To help address these questions two types
of data are examined here: first, quantitative data on people prosecuted for failing to lodge
their 1997 tax return in the Sydney region and their lodgment records over a three-year
                                                          
3 Sparrow found that regulators feel intuitively that this is what they are already doing but closer examination
shows that it is rarely the case.
4 Records of the work done by IHP are not kept centrally so they were unable to say exactly what proportion of
their work is in the area of non-lodgment; however, it is understood to form the bulk of their work.
period; and second, semi-structured interviews conducted with Tax Office In-House
Prosecutions Unit (IHP) staff in Victoria.  The return and lodgement record data have an
advantage over other tax compliance data in that non-lodgment is a clearly defined act that is
neither subjective nor based on a self-report.  The only issues to resolve in relation to
lodgment are whether a return is required or not, and whether the due date has passed.  If the
return is required and it is not lodged by the due date, then non-compliance has occurred.
Non-compliance becomes more serious when all the relevant letters and reminders have been
sent by the Tax Office.
The current compliance management process
There are several steps prior to a prosecution for non-lodgment.  A typical lodgment
enforcement action will take the following course, with occasional variations.
The Australian financial year ends on 30 June and tax returns are due by 31 October for
people preparing their own returns, or by 31 March for those on a tax agent lodgment
program.5 As mentioned above, most returns are lodged voluntarily by the due date, but some
taxpayers fail to do so.  Those who fail to lodge eventually come to the attention of the
Lodgment Enforcement Unit, and it is the task of this unit to secure lodgment of the return.
In the majority of cases a reminder is computer-generated and sent to the taxpayer’s ‘address
for service’, which is often the tax agent’s address.6 The reminder may be followed up with a
telephone call, but this policy varies from office to office and from time to time.  The ‘soft
letter’ is followed by a ‘hard letter’, which is a final notice under section 162 of the Income
Tax Assessment Act.  Again, this is sent to the ‘address for service’.  If the taxpayer does not
respond to the section 162 notice, they have committed the offence of ‘failure to comply with
requirements under taxation law’ under section 8C of the Taxation Administration Act 1953.
At this point the case is referred to the Tax Office’s IHP and a summons is issued.  IHP
handles the prosecution for the Tax Office and its prosecutors attend court on the
                                                          
5 A lodgment program gives tax agents extra time to lodge their clients’ returns as it is recognised they cannot
complete all returns by 31 October.
6 In Australia a tax preparer is known as a tax agent. Roughly 80% of individual returns are prepared by tax
agents, who may be trained accountants. They have a special legal relationship with the taxpayer that requires
the Tax Office to make any queries of the taxpayer through the agent in the first instance. If a taxpayer has an
agent, it is the agent’s address which becomes the ‘address for service’, otherwise it is the taxpayer’s own
address.
Commissioner’s behalf.7 The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) delegates the power to
prosecute to IHP and the staff act according to the Director’s guidelines (1998).
The summons is usually given to a commercial process server to deliver and the summons is
either properly served or it is not.8 In a significant proportion of cases the taxpayer cannot be
located or otherwise avoids service.  If the summons is properly served there are two possible
outcomes: the summons will be voluntarily withdrawn by the Tax Office or the case will go
to court.  The Tax Office’s policy on withdrawal of a summons is quite strict and it would be
considered only in rare cases.  If the case progresses to court, there are again two possible
outcomes: the magistrate will dismiss the case or the defendant will be found guilty.  If found
guilty, there are different levels of penalty that can be applied.  The least severe is a good
behaviour bond under section 19B of the Crimes Act, 1914 which is guilty but without a
conviction entered.9 The next most severe is a conviction, a fine, and a court order demanding
lodgment of the return(s) within 28 days.  A conviction under section 8C is considered to be a
quasi-criminal conviction because there is no jail term attached, and it does not technically
create a criminal record.10
Lodgment details are checked again some time after the section 8C hearing and, if the return
has not been lodged by the nominated date, the taxpayer may be prosecuted again, this time
under section 8H of the Taxation Administration Act (1953).  This charge is the failure to
comply with the court order issued in regard to the section 8C offence.  It is a full criminal
offence and attracts fines of up to $5000 and/or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 12
months.  There are further charges, but these represent less than 1% of cases referred to IHP,
and will not be discussed here.
The penalties shown in the legislation are maximum penalties only and there is considerable
variability in the level of fines imposed.  According to experienced Tax Office prosecutors
who were interviewed for this report, fines vary from state to state, from court to court, and
from magistrate to magistrate.  The variation appears to depend on whether it is a first
                                                          
7 IHP officers are spread around the country and deal with cases on a local or regional basis.
8 A service has to be done in accordance with Regulation 170 of the Income Tax Regulations. A summons can
be personally served on the taxpayer or on someone at their address, or it can simply be left at the address for
service.
9 There is also a good behaviour bond with conviction, but this appears to be rare.
10 For instance, a section 8C conviction would be insufficient to disbar a solicitor from practising.
offence, whether a tax agent was involved, whether the taxpayer attends court,11 whether they
are represented, whether they defend the case, and the attitude of the magistrates, although
there is no known systematic set of data to support this.  Fines are generally lower if the
return is lodged before the court hearing.  Importantly, some taxpayers lodge a return as soon
as they receive a summons, but they may still be prosecuted as, technically, the offence
committed was the failure to comply with the section 162 notice and not the failure to lodge a
return.  Thus it is possible for a taxpayer to lodge a return and still be prosecuted, in a sense,
for not lodging.
It is also important to note that if a taxpayer is prosecuted they cannot be charged a late
lodgment penalty.  A late lodgment penalty is imposed by the Tax Office on most late returns
and is charged at the Treasury bond rate plus 8%.  It is calculated on the amount of tax owing
for the whole period the return was outstanding.12 Some prosecutors believe that people who
will receive a large tax assessment may actually prefer to be prosecuted, as court fines can be
a fraction of the late lodgment penalty they would otherwise receive.
The Lodgment Enforcement Unit is the main source of prosecutions for individual taxpayers,
although there is lodgment work generated by the Child Support Agency (CSA) and the
Small Business Income Tax (Small Business) area.  There are a number of competing
priorities in selecting cases for prosecution.  While the decisions about which cases will be
sent to IHP are made in these referring areas, prosecutors decide which cases they will
actually take on.  In most instances the decision to proceed to prosecution is based on factors
such as the importance placed on the case by the referring area, the age of the final notice,13
the number of returns outstanding, whether a debt will be raised, the level of income of the
taxpayer, their compliance history, and the amount of work already on hand.
However, cases referred by CSA receive different treatment.  CSA is attached to the
Commonwealth Department of Family and Community Services and acts to redistribute
income to custodial parents from non-custodial parents via the tax system.  CSA is
particularly keen to obtain lodgment of returns as the income declared on the return is used to
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12 In 1997 the penalty rate was 17.8% per annum and in 1998 it was 16.8% per annum.
13 The final notice has to be actioned within 12 months or it becomes ‘stale’.
determine the level of child support payments.  CSA has an agreement with the Tax Office
that gives its cases priority over others in relation to prosecution.
Method
The initial data were supplied by the Tax Office, in accordance with established data security
and handling procedures, and were current at July 2000.  These data relate to all people in
New South Wales and Victoria who were issued a summons for their 1997, 1998 or 1999 tax
returns.  These data were supplemented by records obtained directly from Sydney Local
Court appearance lists (known as bench lists) maintained by the Tax Office.  These lists
contained information about whether the summons was correctly served, whether the
taxpayer was convicted or not, and the severity of the sanction.  Due to the relatively low
number of prosecutions for the 1998 and 1999 returns,14 it was decided to examine only
prosecutions for the 1997 returns.  The court data collected related only to prosecutions for
the 1997 return15 conducted by the Sydney IHP between 23 June 1998 and 30 June 2000.
The final sample contained 528 records.  Lodgment records for 1997, 1998 and 1999 were
obtained for this group to see what medium-term effect on lodgment behaviour the
prosecutions achieved.  The data were de-identified to ensure privacy was maintained.
Results
Of the 528 taxpayers in the group, 45.5% eventually lodged a 1997 tax return.  This was in
spite of a substantial group of 38.5% not receiving the summons issued to them.16  If the
people who did not receive a summons are excluded, the overall lodgment rate becomes
63.9%.  It is probable that only those people who received a summons were aware they were
being prosecuted.  With this in mind, we can consider the people who received their
summons to be the treatment group, and the people who did not receive one a comparative
non-treatment group.  Unfortunately they cannot be a control group because we cannot
assume they received the same initial reminders and contacts as the treatment group, due to
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overdue as the 1997 returns. The numbers for these years will build progressively over time.
15 There are a number of instances where returns for more than one year were being demanded. These were
included as ‘multiple-year’ prosecutions, provided 1997 was one of the years being demanded.
16 There are many reasons for non-serving such as incorrect address on the notice, death, hospitalisation, long-
term travel, or deliberate avoidance of the process server.
their apparent untraceability.  It is also possible that some additional factor, such as itinerancy
or leaving the country, explains both why they do not lodge and why they could not be served
a summons.
In the sample of 528, the fines per return outstanding were as low as zero and as high as
$2000 for a single-year section 8C conviction.  The median section 8C fine was $400 for a
single year, and the median fine for a section 8H conviction was $1200 for a single year.
When more than one year is outstanding, the median per year increased to $800 and $1500
per year respectively.  So, not only did the total amount of the fine increase for a multiple
year, the average fine per year did also.  The largest single fine imposed was $9000 for nine
years outstanding on a section 8C offence, but this was later reduced to $3200 on appeal.
The vast majority of prosecutions were for the lesser section 8C offence (n = 477).  As the
people charged with an 8H offence have already been convicted for an 8C offence, they are
prima facie less compliant.  Hence the 8C group and the 8H group will be analysed
separately.  Unfortunately the 8H group is small (n= 51) and the data must be interpreted
with caution.
Table 1 looks at people who have been convicted of the lesser section 8C charge, the levels
of penalty imposed on them, and their rates of lodgment over a three-year period.  Note that
people who received a good behaviour bond have been combined into one category as it was
impossible to determine from the bench lists whether they received a bond with conviction or
a bond without conviction.  Dismissed and withdrawn summonses have been combined for
the same reason.  Fines have been grouped into three categories: small (less than $500),
medium ($500 to $1500) and large (more than $1500).
Unfortunately, inadequacies in the data make it impossible to tell whether the taxpayer
lodged the 1997 return before or after the prosecution was finalised, and there is almost
certainly a proportion of people who lodged when they first received their summons.  These
people would be more likely to be found in the summons withdrawn/dismissed category and
the small fine category, as they are generally treated leniently by magistrates.  Similarly,
people with a relatively poor compliance history would be over-represented in the large fine
category because magistrates tend to treat them less leniently.
Table 1: Relationship between section 8C prosecutions and lodgment
Result category (n) Percentage of 1997
returns lodged
Percentage of 1998
returns lodged
Percentage of 1999
returns lodged
Summons not served
(199)
19.1 26.1 21.1
Summons withdrawn or
dismissed (67)
71.6 67.2 43.3
Good behaviour bond (17) 68.0 92.9 42.9
Convicted and received a
small fine (66)
80.3 65.2 47.0
Convicted and received a
medium fine (70)
61.4 74.3 51.4
Convicted and received a
large fine (58)
53.4 65.5 46.6
The data in Table 1 suggest that the prosecution process may be having an effect as people
who have been served a summons lodge at three to four times the rate of those who have not,
at least for that year.  While lodgment rates slip to just below the 50% mark two years later in
most ‘served’ categories, the rate of lodgment for the served group is still more than twice
that of the non-served group.
The most favourable initial compliance response appears to come from a small or medium
fine, but by 1999 there is little difference between any of the served categories.  A good
behaviour bond is most effective in the 1998 year, but lodgment rates fall away noticeably in
the 1999 year.  It is interesting to note that large fines are linked to a significantly lower rate
of lodgment in the first year.  This could be due to an over-representation of people with
multiple-year prosecutions.  However, the large fine/low lodgment relationship remains even
when the multiple-year cases are removed.  Hence it may be that a large fine initially
produces a worse compliance outcome than a medium or small fine.  On the other hand, we
cannot rule out the possibility that taxpayers in the large fine category had a history of non-
compliance and the fines they received were increased accordingly.
As the lodgment rates converge over time the differences in severity of punishment do not
seem to have a sustained effect on behaviour, either positive or negative.  Hence it could be
argued that the severity of punishment is unimportant in determining medium-term
compliance.  Perhaps it is the fact of receiving a sanction per se, rather than the severity of
the sanction, that produces the compliant response.
While all types of sanction are more successful, in varying degrees, than no sanction, it
should be remembered that a large proportion of taxpayers have failed to lodge at all.  In
other words, for a significant number, sanctions did not result in compliance.
Table 2 shows lodgment rates for section 8H prosecutions.  Section 8H offences are more
serious than section 8C offences and, consequently, no one has received a small fine.  There
is the additional category of warrant, being a warrant for the arrest of the taxpayer.  Note that
the sample is very small (n = 5117).
Table 2: Relationship between section 8H prosecutions and lodgment
Result category (n)
Frequency (%) of 1997
returns lodged
(n)
Frequency (%) of 1998
returns lodged
(n)
Frequency (%) of 1999
returns lodged
(n)
Summons not served
(13)
0.0
(0)
7.7
(1)
0.0
(0)
Summons withdrawn or
dismissed (4)
50.0
(2)
50.0
(2)
25.0
(1)
Bond (3) 33.3
(1)
66.6
(2)
33.3
(1)
Medium fine
(14)
50.0
(7)
35.7
(5)
14.3
(2)
Large fine (13) 30.8
(4)
15.4
(2)
15.4
(2)
Warrant (3) 33.3
(1)
66.6
(2)
33.3
(1)
Lodgment rates are significantly lower than for section 8C cases.  While the sample is too
small to draw firm conclusions there appears to be less likelihood that a taxpayer will lodge
following a second prosecution.  Perhaps people who already had been prosecuted found the
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idea of a follow-up prosecution less of a deterrent.  Then again, it could be that the people
who are prosecuted twice and still do not lodge their tax returns are the most intractable in
the entire taxpaying population and sanctions may simply have no effect on them.
Logistic regression predicting lodgment
The dependent variable in the data is dichotomous, that is, there are only two possible
outcomes.  The first possible outcome is that the return was lodged; the second is that it was
not.  In order to determine the relative importance of the independent variables in predicting
this outcome a logistic regression analysis was carried out.  The analysis showed that there
are four factors in the data that have significant explanatory capacity: a) offence type (section
8H or 8C); b) whether the summons was served; c) use of tax agent; and d) whether the
taxpayer received a refund in the previous year.  When combined, these factors explain
37.6% of the variation.18  The analyses reported in Tables 3a and 3b show the importance of
these variables and also show the significance of being a client of CSA.  Those who were
clients of CSA were less likely to lodge their tax return, although this effect disappeared
when the other variables were entered into the model.  Each of these dependent variables is
dichotomous.  Note that the logistic regression relates to 1997 returns only as there was no
apparent relationship between the variables and levels of lodgment in 1998 and 1999.
Table 3a: Logistic regression results
Model 1 Model 2
Predictors B coefficients Wald statistic B coefficients Wald statistic
Child Support Agency -0.648 11.50** -0.433 3.63
Offence type 1.176 10.55**
Summons served 1.986 76.85**
Use of tax agent 1.349 37.66**
Refund in previous year -0.557 6.79**
Nagelkerke R2 0.03 .382**
* = significant at the 0.05 level.  ** = significant at the 0.01 level.
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Table 3b: Classification table for 1997 lodgment returns
Predicted
1997 lodgment
Observed Yes No
Percentage
Correct
1997 lodgment
             Yes
             No
169
75
70
213
70.7
74.0
Overall percentage 72.5
Nagelkerke R2 = . 382
Chi-square = 177.40**
These results can be interpreted as follows:
a) Offence type (H=0, C=1).  The more serious section 8H cases have a significantly lower
likelihood of lodging than section 8C cases.
b) Summons served (Not served = 0, served = 1).  Serving a summons has a significant
impact on likelihood of lodgment.  Those who receive a summons are more likely to lodge
than those who do not.
c) Use of tax agent (No agent = 0, agent = 1).  If the taxpayer has a tax agent, lodgment is
more likely to occur.  Service of summons and presence of agent are moderately correlated
(.26), indicating that it is easier to serve the summons when a taxpayer has a tax agent.
Nevertheless, the findings show that having a tax agent improves the likelihood of lodgment,
after controlling for whether or not a summons was served.  It is unclear how to interpret this
finding, but it could be that having a tax agent indicates a higher level of engagement in the
tax system in the first instance.  It could also be that tax agents are responsible for the
problem in some cases by not passing on warning letters to their clients.  It is also possible
that people, on receiving a summons, consulted an agent to help them lodge a return.
d) Refund in previous year (No refund = 0, refund = 1). This is an unexpected result.  People
who receive a refund in one year are usually salary and wage earners, and this generally
means they could expect to receive a refund in subsequent years (the 1997 return in this
instance).  It would seem that people who received a refund in a previous year would be more
than willing to lodge their tax return.  However, this outcome might be explained by ‘refund
in previous year’ and ‘Child Support Agency' relationship being slightly correlated (.16).  If a
person with a CSA relationship has an outstanding child support debt their tax refund can be
seized by the agency, and this might provide a disincentive to lodge.
Interviews with IHP staff
To help understand the quantitative data from New South Wales, seven semi-structured
interviews were conducted with selected IHP staff in the Victorian region.19 The interviews
were conducted in October 2000 and were recorded.
The interviews revealed that there was a significant prosecution workload.  Staff felt they had
only a limited amount of discretion about the cases they took on and so attempted to do most
or all of them.  One unit in Victoria had up to 500 cases at any one time and only three
prosecutors to deal with them.
Due to inadequacies in the case recording systems only the number of prosecutions
completed is recorded.  The amount of debt raised, for example, does not count and is not
recorded.  This means that two small debt cases would count as a higher achievement than
one large debt case.  This creates an incentive to follow the simple high turnover cases at the
expense of the more difficult cases.  One officer said that they ‘look for the thin files’
because this will help get numbers up (Interview 5).  The case recording systems also do not
record work done outside the actual prosecution.  Thus if lodgment could be obtained by, say,
making a phone call, this would not be counted as a success.  This encourages staff to pursue
a prosecution even if other alternatives for obtaining lodgment are available to them.  The
DPP guidelines state that ‘a prosecution should not proceed if there is no prospect of a
conviction being secured’ (1998, p 3).  Some prosecutors take this to mean that they should
only pursue cases they are assured of winning, and this further encourages them to undertake
straightforward cases.  When they do tackle the harder or bigger cases, they come up against
people who have the resources and knowledge to slow the cases down.  Officers avoid such
cases because they keep documented success statistics down.
Most of the staff identified the non-service of summonses as a major issue for IHP, although
they thought it was less of a problem in their region.  The researcher suggested that this
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problem could be overcome by a phone call before issuing the summons.  Such a phone call
would serve two purposes: it could save time and cost in relation to sending summonses to
the wrong address; and it could also serve as a final reminder to people who have not
received the appropriate warnings from their tax agents.  There was general agreement with
this idea, but most officers were adamant it needed to occur in the referring areas, at least
partly because of a perceived legal requirement that they not contact taxpayers themselves.20
The case referral guidelines suggest that phone contact should be made, but it appears that
referring areas sometimes do not make sufficient effort in this regard.  One IHP officer
complained that a lot of files came over with the notation ‘contact attempted’, as though that
was considered sufficient (Interview 7).  The officer suggested that lodgment enforcement
people should be encouraged to go out and visit when phone contact fails.  That said, it is
possible that the difficulty in contacting clients is actually an indication of the type of
taxpayer subject to prosecution in that they may be more itinerant than the average person.  It
could also suggest problems in the Tax Office’s tracing process.
Some of the interviewees were reluctant to blame referring areas for their problems.
Inexperienced staff members in referring areas did not know the proper procedures and
difficult cases were sent to IHP, making it a ‘sort of dumping ground for problem cases’
(Interview 7).21  The Tax Office internal procedure document on case referral, Quality
decision making in relation to lodgment compliance (Commissioner of Taxation, 1999),
recognises this problem.  It states that ‘the outcome we seek is to deter an unthinking
production line approach to the management of lodgment cases which result(s) in
inappropriate escalation of cases for prosecution and the unnecessary incurring of legal
expenditure’.22  These guidelines reflect the intention of the compliance model and it is hoped
they will be increasingly incorporated into future work practices.  Still, one senior prosecutor
said it was not sufficient to simply give more guidelines to the referring areas because they
were already swamped.  He suggested that prosecutors need to work with them, to advise
them, and to select the more deserving cases (Interview 1).  Such cooperation would mean an
                                                          
20 The guidelines state that granting an extension of time after a final notice has been issued will invalidate the
notice. Some staff seem to have taken this to mean that they cannot initiate any type of contact with taxpayers
who have received a final notice.
21 The starkest example of this is a Child Support Agency case that was referred for prosecution because the
Child Support Agencey staff member did not know how to raise a section 167, or default, assessment.
22 Quality decision making in relation to lodgment compliance, Commissioner of Taxation, 1999, p. 2.
increase in the number of more complex cases, but a decrease in the high turnover cases.  It
was recognised that this move would need support from senior managers.
IHP staff believe that the prosecution process encourages the broader community to remain
compliant, and they felt this occurs by spreading knowledge via court appearances.  It was
pointed out that only a handful of lawyers and defendants witness court cases, and that not
many people would learn of prosecution through this process.  Two officers mentioned that
the Tax Office was now endeavouring to get stories in the press, but experience has shown
that routine lodgment prosecution are rarely considered newsworthy.23  Even if a report did
make the papers, the Tax Office would still have to rely on people reading the item.  This
suggests there is no real mechanism for creating a broad awareness in the community about
prosecution, and what its significance might be.  Two things support this view: interviewees
reported that taxpayers are occasionally surprised when they are prosecuted; and another
officer said they had to work hard to convince taxpayers that the offence they had committed
was ‘serious’ (Interview 3).
The quantitative results were discussed with staff and it was suggested that a more flexible
attitude to withdrawing summonses might be appropriate, especially for those people who
had already lodged a return.  For instance, it is possible that taxpayers react badly because
they had lodged a return and were still punished, in their eyes, for not lodging.  There was
some variation in staff responses to this dilemma but most felt they had no choice but to
proceed, because the late lodgment penalty is waived immediately the summons is issued.  If
the summons is withdrawn and the taxpayer escapes a court fine they receive no financial
sanction at all, and this could lead to abuse of the system.  This appears to be an important
anomaly.  At one time a withdrawal of a summons meant that internal penalties could be
reapplied, but the introduction of Section 8ZE of the ITAA put a stop to this.  Apparently a
Justice in a Hobart case said that the Commissioner could seek the penalty under section 161
instead, but so far this has not been tested.  Some prosecutors thought this anomaly also
created an incentive for higher income earners to seek prosecution, as it means their late
lodgment penalty would be waived.
                                                          
23 At least in major cities, although this is not the case in regional centres.
The previously mentioned problem with the case recording system also makes officers
reluctant to withdraw summonses, as court costs and fines are something tangible that can be
documented.24  Staff did not know how many of the people who had been prosecuted actually
paid their fines, as the fines are paid to the court and the court could not provide this
information.  It is therefore possible that people do not pay their fines and it is difficult to
imagine the deterrence effect this might be having.  Taxpayers can also approach the court
and ask for the fine to be converted to community service.  Further to the other computer
system problems, an important point raised was that the compliance model could work
effectively only when there is full and correct information about a taxpayer’s compliance
history.  Without this it is difficult to make correct judgements about whether taxpayers
should be escalated up or down the compliance model.  It was suggested that current systems
are inadequate for this purpose.
In spite of being influenced to pursue simple cases, IHP officers have embraced the
compliance model and feel that their work lies at the top of the regulatory pyramid.
Interestingly, this gives them the scope to reject cases from the referring areas.  Staff have
rejected some cases when they do not meet their idea of high non-compliance criteria, but
only on a few occasions.  This does not extend to CSA where staff have the understanding
that it is not possible to reject cases due to the agreement.  This frustrates them as CSA cases
are often people on welfare and they feel that there are more deserving and productive cases
than these.25  A senior prosecutor suggested this problem could be overcome by greater use of
section 167 assessments.  This section of the Income Tax Assessment Act allows the
Commissioner to raise an assessment without a return and, as information about welfare
payments is available from other sources, a return would become unnecessary.  Earlier
prosecution guidelines (IT Ruling 2246) discouraged this practice because many taxpayers
would subsequently provide their correct income details and this meant ‘double handling’.
On the other hand, correct income details are what the Tax Office is seeking, and perhaps this
procedure should be compared to prosecutions on a cost–benefit basis.
                                                          
24 One person said it was demoralising to go through all the work of setting up a case and then not proceed with
it, and that you should always proceed on cases you are going to win.
25 However, when a senior Child Support Agency officer was told about this he said that the Child Support
Agency were not interested in prosecuting welfare recipients because fines only eroded the taxpayer’s capacity
to pay child support.. This may point to communication problems between or within the Child Support Agency
and IHP.
Another point that was regularly mentioned was that prosecutors have lower job
classifications, and therefore lower salaries, than their colleagues in other areas, in spite of
the high levels of responsibility of the position.26  As one officer put it, ‘we are in court day
after day making decisions on behalf of the Commissioner’ (Interview 1).  The high level of
responsibility and stress of the job, and the lower salary, make it difficult to attract and keep
good staff because ‘if you pay peanuts you get monkeys’ (ibid).  As a result of this, and of an
office-wide draining of experienced staff into the new tax lines,27 IHP are struggling with low
staff numbers and inexperienced prosecutors.  Unfortunately, there has been no
corresponding reduction in the amount of work coming in.  One officer put it this way: ‘the
factory grinds on but there are no people in the factory.  The other areas still put their case in
and expect it will work its way through’ (Interview 1).
Analytic conclusions
The effectiveness of prosecution for obtaining lodgment, and its effect on future compliance
behaviour, can now be examined in light of the findings.  It appears that being prosecuted
does moderately improve compliance for some taxpayers, but the effect is not universal.  Of
the taxpayers who received their summons 63.9% lodged their 1997 tax return, but lodgment
rates slipped to 46.9% after two years.  These figures are lower when non-served cases are
included as the non-served group is lodging returns at a substantially lower rate.  If one
assumes that those who received a summons are similar on other compliance-related
variables to those who did not, serving a summons appears to be significantly better than
doing nothing.
There is considerable variation in lodgment rates between fine categories with, perhaps most
notably, large fine cases lodging at significantly lower rates than small fine cases in the first
year.  Brehm and Brehm (1981) found that citizens who feel that the level of punishment is
unjustified can display a behaviour, known as reactance, which is diametrically opposed to
that being sought, and we could be seeing evidence of this here.  On the other hand the
convergence of lodgment rates indicates that the compliance effect produced by the severity
of punishment, either positive or negative, fades with time.  This may support the hypothesis
                                                          
26 Staff at the public service grade of ASO4 level do the prosecution work. For the same level of responsibility,
staff could expect to be one or two grades higher in the Tax Office’s new GST line.
27 Required by a government-sponsored review of the Australian taxation system.
that being sanctioned is the critical variable, rather than variation in the severity of the
sanction, in governing compliance behaviour.  Notably the summons-withdrawn category
shows very similar results to a full prosecution despite being a much gentler intervention.
This may suggest that we can regard receiving a summons as itself being a sanction.  The
summons could be thought of as the initial lower level sanction in the prosecution process,
with the court ‘appearance’ and fine as the secondary higher level sanctions.
As to the role of prosecution in maintaining the integrity of the taxation system, the findings
are necessarily more speculative.  However, we can still draw some cautious conclusions.
For instance, prosecution may not be as effective a deterrent as one might hope because there
is not a universal belief that failing to lodge a tax return is a serious offence.  This is
supported by Broadhurst and Indermaur (1982) who found that, in terms of seriousness,
respondents ranked tax evasion only 22 out of 27 offences.  Non-lodgment of returns was not
specified as an offence in that study but one might assume it would be considered less serious
than evasion.  This may explain why some people do not see the lodgment of their tax return
as a major issue, and why others could feel that the punishment of prosecution is too severe
for the crime.  Of course this conclusion only relates to non-lodgment and not to more serious
offences where, presumably, prosecution would still be viewed as appropriate.
The poor compliance outcomes for section 8H prosecutions suggest that people who have
already been prosecuted will not comply in response to a second prosecution.  This may
indicate that it is the threat of the prosecution that is acting as a deterrent and, once this threat
has been realised, it loses its effect.  Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) have argued that
regulators should ‘walk softly while carrying a big stick’.  Knowing that one could be
prosecuted for non-compliance is an incentive for moving down the pyramid and complying
and once prosecuted the taxpayer loses the incentive to cooperate.  This explanation is
consistent with the results found here, but further work would be required to confirm this.
Still, it may not be sufficient just to threaten prosecution as ‘idle threats’ are quickly seen as
such and can undermine compliance (ibid).  Understanding the apparent lack of effectiveness
of subsequent prosecution is important for the Tax Office as a significant number of people
do not lodge in response to the initial prosecution and something will have to be done to
ensure they do not fall out of the system.
Another reason the deterrent effect of prosecution may be lessened is that the majority of
people do not attend their court hearings.  If the court case takes place in their absence the
experience is less unpleasant and the effect is reduced accordingly.  Further, once a person
learns that they can be prosecuted without leaving their lounge room, future prosecutions
may have less of a deterrent effect on them.  There is also less chance to establish
communication and perhaps encourage these citizens back into the system when they do have
to engage with the Tax Office.  Tyler (2001) found that people are more likely to comply if
they are treated fairly and that their perceptions of fair treatment were enhanced if they felt
their views were heard and taken into consideration.  Hence it might be that establishing
communication is one of the key leverage points in improving compliance.  As the process is
currently set up it is possible, if the summons is not served on the taxpayer personally, for the
whole prosecution to take place without actually speaking to the taxpayer.  In extreme cases
the whole process can even be completed without their knowledge, and it would be
interesting to explore what effect this might have on the taxpayer.
Intuitively it would seem that prosecution may not be as effective as a broad deterrent on the
mainstream taxpayer as one might initially assume, as it seems that only those people who
attend court receive any real information about it.  On the other hand one could argue that a
lack of widespread information about non-lodgment prosecution, and by implication the
knowledge of a group that does not lodge willingly, is actually positive for compliance in the
broader population, since compliant taxpayers will not have their faith in the system
undermined.  Moreover, it is not even necessary for the bulk of the population to know about
prosecution as they are already voluntarily compliant in the main.  Only those who have
failed to lodge, or are at risk of doing so, need to be made aware of its existence.  If details of
prosecution are clearly communicated to them at the lodgment enforcement stage, it could
still act as a deterrent to those taxpayers.
It will be interesting to follow this group of citizens over the next year or two to see what
happens to their lodgment rates.  It may also be worthwhile to replicate this research in
another state to see if the results hold there.  A different approach to the data may also be
useful as a considerable amount of the variation is still to be explained.  For instance, Tyler
(2001) has found that perceived fairness of procedures accounts for a substantial amount of
the variation in compliance.  Unfortunately this factor could not be investigated in this paper
as the data were unsuitable.  Additional research is planned that will look into the experiences
and motivational postures of taxpayers who have been prosecuted, and their perceptions of
procedural fairness will be examined.  It might be useful to revisit the data analysed here in
the light of that research.
Making the compliance model work: Policy and administrative challenges
Prosecution appears to have become a routine response in the case of non-lodgment.
Increasing the number of prosecutions, rather than obtaining the correct details of a
taxpayer’s income, appears to have become the aim.  There are a number of factors
contributing to this, including an assumption that prosecution will obtain lodgment; cases
being referred to IHP that probably shouldn’t be; problems with the legislation in regard to
waiving penalties; problems with case recording systems; and a processing culture brought
about by high workloads.
The following are suggestions for making prosecution work more effectively and more in
accordance with the compliance model.
1. The primary policy implication is around section 8ZE and the anomaly created by the
obligatory waiving of late lodgment penalties once a summons has been issued.  In the
current situation, taxpayers who receive a summons and then lodge are still prosecuted
because they will otherwise escape any financial penalty.  Taxpayers who lodge their
returns should be de-escalated down the pyramid rather than up to prosecution.
Prosecuting when a taxpayer is cooperating is contrary to the responsive philosophy of
the compliance model.  This needs to be addressed either by legislative amendment or by
pursuing alternatives, such as seeking a penalty under section 161.  A solution to this
problem would also remove the apparent cost advantage incentive for high income
earners to seek prosecution.
2. Further to point 1, late lodgment penalty has the advantage over fines of being collected
via the tax system rather than through the courts, and this could be beneficial for revenue
reasons.  It also places control of penalties in the hands of the Tax Office, which means
they can be managed more strategically and in accordance with the compliance model.
3. It is noteworthy that a summons is itself effective as a sanction, and a withdrawn
summons is roughly as successful as a completed prosecution.  Perhaps this could be
considered as a standard response particularly for those who have lodged in advance of
the court hearing date.  The potential for withdrawal can also be a useful leverage point to
obtain lodgment from less recalcitrant taxpayers.  As a policy a withdrawal has the added
advantage of showing people trust, of engaging them in the system, and moving them
down the compliance pyramid.  Even if the results were marginally worse than a full
prosecution, a withdrawal is cheaper, does not impose the same costs on the taxpayer-
funded court system, and does not give a lot of ‘little’ people a court record.  It may be a
better strategy for these reasons.  Further, the lodgment rates for a withdrawn summons
could possibly be enhanced by appropriate use of written reprimands and other sanctions.
This policy might also prevent desensitising some people to the prosecution process.
4. Non-service of summonses is a major problem for IHP.  It is possible that this sample has
an abnormally high level of non-service, but any non-service of a summons is inefficient,
costly, and has significant negative implications in terms of obtaining lodgment.  Phone
contact before referral to IHP is very important.  Phone contact can limit the number of
summonses sent to the wrong address, and it will also act as a direct reminder to people
who have not received or paid attention to earlier notices, perhaps due to problems with
their tax agent.  As Tyler demonstrates, communication with taxpayers is an important
leverage point in influencing behaviour.  It should be impressed upon the referring areas
of the Tax Office that establishing contact is important.  Perhaps referring areas should be
encouraged to visit the taxpayer, gather information about the case, and give a very
personal final warning, should phone contact fail.  As an extreme solution, IHP could
simply refuse to take cases where no contact has been made.
5. At present the bulk of people who fail to respond to prosecution are not followed up,
possibly on the assumption that they would have already lodged.  Section 8H can be used
but the data suggest that it is not very effective.  Some new tool or response, such as a
personal visit or call centre, may need to be developed.  Perhaps section 167 assessments
could be raised more regularly.  While this may lead to ‘double handling’ in some
instances, it should result in the correct details being obtained, and that is ultimately the
desired outcome.
6. The data suggest that larger fines are linked with lower rates of compliance.  While the
data do not allow us to rule out the possibility that it is a social selection effect, it is
possible that reactance could be pushing some taxpayers out of the system and making
them more non-compliant in the medium term.  However, it would be fair to say that this
probably represents a fairly small group and the effect reduces with time.  Either way the
data suggest that the most effective fine may be a small to medium one in the first
instance.
7. There is an unknown effect on the compliance response of fines imposed because a
number of people do not pay their fines.  A monitoring system showing who has paid or
not paid their fines would allow further follow-up of non-payers, as well as the
development of a better understanding of the relationship between financial penalty and
compliance.  Further work is also required to understand exactly which aspects of the
prosecution process are acting as deterrents.  This could be used to enhance effectiveness.
This will require dialogue with people who have previously been prosecuted.  It is
recommended that additional research be commissioned in this area.
8. The division between the IHP and Lodgment Enforcement Unit means the two areas are
dealing with the one ‘problem’.  Unfortunately, combining the areas is not possible as
they were deliberately separated to satisfy DPP independence policies.  As an alternative,
prosecution staff and managers could be encouraged to work more closely with the staff
of referring areas to advise on what are suitable and strategic cases for prosecution.
Establishment of coordinating forums should also be considered if they do not already
exist.  Prosecutors also need to better understand that they do have discretion to reject
cases that do not meet compliance model criteria.  They should be encouraged to use this
discretion regularly, as it might lead to more rigorous work on the cases that are referred
to them.
9. A new case reporting system is needed in which all IHP’s actions and successes can be
recorded.  The new system should remove the unintentional incentive to pursue simple
cases.  A new system is due by mid 2001 and is expected to help in this regard.  An
improved reporting system is also necessary to allow staff to correctly determine taxpayer
compliance history so that they can treat taxpayers appropriately and in accordance with
the compliance model.
10. CSA cases need to be judged on their merits and only those that are at the top of the
compliance model should be prosecuted.  Communication between or within CSA and
IHP in relation to prosecution expectations could be improved.  The client contact
principles promoted in Quality decision making in relation to lodgment compliance
(Commissioner of Taxation, 1999) are also recommended for action within CSA.
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